Pennington, Jr., Student Activity Center were completed. Southeastern fared well and suffered no major structural damages (although the University campus did lose many trees).Southeastern began its first year under the full Board of Regents Master Plan admissions criterion. On August 29, just six days into the semester, Hurricane Katrina hit southeast Louisiana, devastating the parishes of St. After the storm, Southeastern was able to play an instrumental role in the relief effort by providing housing for the National Guard, disaster relief teams from across the country and utility workers.
And until the narrowing takes place (and maybe even after that), the law will be remarkably vague. This would indeed cover the examples I gave, since there it may be very likely that the speaker does indeed want to make the listener feel “abused” or “tormented” (if that’s what’s required), and that there was no immediately preceding provocation.Note that the law isn’t limited to messages sent only to the target, but includes speech published to the world at large as well. UPDATE: Some commenters suggested that “malicious” is sufficiently well-defined because it arises often in legal contexts.Would sending a message castigating an ex-lover for cheating (assuming both the ex-lover and the sender are 17) qualify as “malicious and willful intent to … What if the message “speak[s] insultingly, harshly, and unjustly” (unjustly, that is, in the view of the judge), which is the dictionary definition of “abuse” that seems most relevant to speech? But the trouble is that means different things in different contexts.This is not bad as the earlier version, which also applied to speech intended to “embarrass, or cause emotional distress.” But it’s still pretty bad, especially because it leaves unclear what exactly is a “malicious and willful intent to …abuse [or] torment.” Would publishing an online editorial — or a blog post — condemning an underage criminal for his crimes qualify as “malicious and willful intent to … Or would it not be “malicious” because it would be justified by righteous indignation (in which case I take it courts would have to decide what indignation is righteous and what is not)? Paul (holding that content-based distinctions are presumptively unconstitutional even when they operate within an unprotected category of speech).
The exception for religious speech is also probably unconstitutional, because it treats nonreligious speech worse than religious speech. In the constitutional law of libel, “actual malice” means simply reckless or knowledge about the falsehood of the statement, pretty clearly not what’s intended here.